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Cluelessness 
Hilary Greaves, University of Oxford 
Abstract. Decisions, whether moral or prudential, should be guided at least in part by considerations 
of the consequences that would result from the various available actions. For any given action, 
however, the majority of its consequences are unpredictable at the time of decision. Many have 
worried that this leaves us, in some important sense, clueless. 
In this paper, I distinguish between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ possible sources of cluelessness. In terms 
of this taxonomy, the majority of the existing literature on cluelessness focusses on the simple 
sources. I argue, contra James Lenman in particular, that these would-be sources of cluelessness are 
unproblematic, on the grounds that indifference-based reasoning is far less problematic than 
Lenman (along with many others) supposes. 
However, there does seem to be a genuine phenomenon of cluelessness associated with the 
‘complex’ sources; here, indifference-based reasoning is inapplicable by anyone’s lights. This 
‘complex problem of cluelessness’ is vivid and pressing, in particular, in the context of Effective 
Altruism. This motivates a more thorough examination of the precise nature of cluelessness, and the 
precise source of the associated phenomenology of discomfort in forced-choice situations. The latter 
parts of the paper make some initial explorations in those directions. 
 
1. Cluelessness about objective betterness 
The cluelessness worry. Assume determinism.1 Then, for any given (sufficiently precisely described) 
act A, there is a fact of the matter about which possible world would be realised – what the future 
course of history would be – if I performed A. Some acts would lead to better consequences (that is, 
better future histories) than others. Given a pair of alternative actions A1, A2, let us say that  
(OB: Criterion of objective c-betterness) A1 is objectively c-better than A2 iff the 
consequences of A1 are better than those of A2. 
It is obvious that we can never be absolutely certain, for any given pair of acts A1, A2, of whether or 
not A1 is objectively c-better than A2. This in itself would be neither problematic nor surprising: there 
is very little in life, if anything, of which we can be absolutely certain. Some have argued, however, 
for the following further claim: 
(CWo: Cluelessness Worry regarding objective c-betterness) We can never have even the 
faintest idea, for any given pair of acts (A1, A2), whether or not A1 is objectively c-better than 
A2. 
This ‘cluelessness worry’ has at least some more claim to be troubling. (I return in section 2 to the 
question of whether it is troubling; and in section 6 to the question of what exactly “can’t have the 
faintest idea” means.) This is most obvious in the case of consequentialism. For if (CWo) is correct, 
                                                          
1 Relaxing this assumption would complicate some parts of the discussion, but not in ways that are ultimately relevant to the issues in this paper. 
and if in addition (as consequentialism holds) the moral status of an action is determined entirely by 
how it compares to alternative actions in terms of the goodness of its consequences, it seems to 
follow with particular clarity that we can never have even the faintest idea what the moral status of 
any given action is. But any plausible moral theory will agree that considerations of consequence-
goodness are at least morally relevant – that they should be taken serious account of both in moral 
decision-making and in moral evaluation, as at least one important factor. And this too seems 
impossible in practice if (CWo) is correct.2 
The argument for (CWo) stems from the observation that the relevant consequences include all 
consequences of the actions in question, throughout all time. In attempting actually to take 
consequences into account in practice, we usually focus on those effects – let us call them 
‘foreseeable’ effects – that we take ourselves to be able to foresee with a reasonable degree of 
confidence. (These may or may not be any intuitive sense ‘direct’ effects, and may or may not be 
close to the point of action in time and/or space.) And while we are arguably correct in thinking that 
we are justified in being reasonably confident in our predictions of these effects, any choice of one 
act A1 over another A2 inevitably has countless additional consequences that our calculation takes no 
account of. A butterfly flapping its wings in Texas may cause a hurricane in Bangladesh; so too may 
my telling a white lie, refraining from telling that lie, moving or not moving my hand; a hurricane will 
certainly affect which other butterflies flap their wings or which other agents move their hands in 
which ways; and so the effects will ripple down the millennia. Any conclusion, on the basis of the 
calculations that we have carried out, that one act is indeed objectively better another is justified 
only insofar as we are justified in assuming 
(NRo (Non-reversal for objective c-betterness)) The net effect of taking into account all of 
these additional effects would not reverse the judgment that we reach based on the 
foreseeable effects alone. 
But is (NRo) true? 
Here are two bad arguments for (NRo). 
The ‘ripples on a pond’ postulate. First, one might think that while there are indeed non-zero 
effects, traceable to even the most trivial of one’s actions, stretching down through the millennia, 
still the magnitude of any individual such effect typically decays with time. Further – letting ΔV≔ 
V(A1)-V(A2) be the amount by which the goodness of the consequences of A1 exceeds that of A2 – 
one might think that this decay is sufficiently fast that by far the largest contribution to ΔV comes 
from the foreseeable effects, most of which latter are in practice temporally close to the point of 
action. Call this the ‘ripples on a pond’ postulate. It is suggested (though not strongly advocated3) by 
Moore: 
                                                          
2 Here I am in agreement with Smart (1973, p.34), Kagan (1998, p.63) and Mason (2004), each of whom initially raises the issue of cluelessness in the context of consequentialism, but then notes that in fact the problem affects a much wider class of moral theories. In contrast, many others appear to regard the problem as peculiar to consequentialism (including: Norcross (1990), Lenman (2000), Cowen (2006), Feldman (2006), Dorsey (2012), Burch-Brown (2014)). 
3 Unlike Smart, Moore for the most part confines himself to asserting the necessity of defending (NRo), by the means suggested or otherwise, “if any of our judgments of right and wrong are to pretend to probability” (Moore, ibid., section 93). 
“As we proceed further and further from the time at which alternative actions are open to 
us, the events of which either action would be part cause become increasingly dependent on 
those other circumstances, which are the same, whichever action we adopt. The effects of 
any individual action seem, after a sufficient space of time, to be found only in trifling 
modifications spread over a very wide area, whereas its immediate effects consist in some 
prominent modification of a comparatively narrow area. Since, however, most of the things 
which have any great importance for good or evil are things of this prominent kind, there 
may be a probability that after a certain time all the effects of any particular action become 
so nearly indifferent, that any difference between their value and that of the effects of 
another action, is very unlikely to outweigh an obvious difference in the value of the 
immediate effects.” (1903, §93) 
Similarly Smart (who apparently does advocate it): 
“[W]e do not normally in practice need to consider very remote consequences, as these in 
the end rapidly approximate to zero like the furthermost ripples on a pond after a stone has 
been dropped into it.” (1973, p.33)  
The ‘ripples on a pond’ postulate, though, is not plausible. To see this most vividly, note that even 
our most trivial actions are very likely to have unforeseen identity-affecting effects (although the 
same points could be made without appeal to identity-affectingness). Suppose, for example, that I 
pause on my way home from work, in order to help an old lady across the road. As a result, both she 
and I are in any given place – any given position on the pavement for the remainder of our 
respective journeys home, for instance – at different times, at least for the remainder of that day. As 
a result, we advance or delay the journeys of countless others, if only by a few seconds, relative to 
the situation in which I had not helped her across the road; both we and they affect which further 
parties enjoy chance meetings with whom; and so forth. At least some of these others were destined 
to conceive a child on the day in question, and if so, even our trivial influences on their day will 
affect, if not whether they conceive, then at least which particular child they conceive (since a delay 
in sexual intercourse of even a few seconds is overwhelmingly likely to affect which particular sperm 
fertilises the egg).4 But once my trivial decision has affected that, it equally counts as causally 
responsible for everything the child in question does during his/her life (i.e., for the differences 
between the actions/effects of this child vs. those that the alternative, in fact unconceived, child 
would have performed/had) – and of all the causal consequences of all those things, stretching down 
as they do through the millenia. These consequences are clearly not negligible: many or most of the 
things that one child does and that the alternative child would not have done (or vice versa) amount 
to greater differences in goodness than the intrinsic value of one old lady’s receiving help across the 
road on one occasion. Nor is it at all likely that the number of identities my action affects in 
generation r will decrease as r increases; on the contrary, it will increase. 
The cancellation postulate. Might one resurrect (NRo) by arguing that although there are, for any 
choice of a given action A1 over an alternative A2, countless effects of significant size stretching 
arbitrarily far into the future, that nonetheless these unforeseeable effects are highly likely to cancel 
                                                          
4 Lenman (2000) presses the point that at least many morally important actions, such as killings, abortions and procreative actions, are identity-affecting. Parfit has argued, as I do here, that the same is also true of less obviously identity-directed actions (1984, chapter 16). 
one another out, and to do so to an arbitrarily high degree of precision as the time horizon stretches  
to infinity? If so, then their combined effect will be much smaller than the foreseeable effect, even if 
the effect of any individual unforeseeable consequence is comparable to that of the foreseen 
consequences. Call the postulate that these conditions do indeed obtain the cancellation postulate. 
Unfortunately, the cancellation postulate is false. The theory of random walks tells us that while 
some degree of cancelling-out in such situations is all but certain, the combined effect of a large 
number n of probabilistically independent steps tends to grow with n, and in particular that it is 
highly unlikely to end up anywhere sufficiently close to zero.5 This result is, on reflection, intuitively 
extremely plausible: the observation is that it is extremely unlikely, for instance, that the difference 
in net value between everything this child does in his/her life on the one hand and everything the 
alternative child would have done in his/her life on the other will just happen to be smaller than the 
intrinsic value of one old lady’s receiving help across the road on one occasion, even if we pretend 
that each of a child’s actions is probabilistically independent of each of the same child’s other 
actions; and increasing the number of children involved will only exacerbate the problem.6 
These arguments against possible defences of (NRo) are equally reasons for thinking that (NRo) in fact 
is true only in roughly 50% of cases. We are forced to conclude that (CWo) is true, in the following 
sense: we can never be justified, for any given pair of acts, in having credence significantly greater 
than 50% that either is objectively c-better than the other. 
2. Cluelessness about subjective c-betterness 
The truth of (CWo) would be troubling, however, only if it followed that there was no way for 
considerations of consequences to guide either decisions or evaluations; and (OB) is not the only 
possible route for that to happen. In fact, consequentialists in particular have long recognised both 
the availability and the indispensability of a second such possible route, viz. the appeal to a relation 
of subjective c-betterness among actions: 
(SB: Criterion of subjective c-betterness) Act A1 is subjectively c-better than A2 iff the 
expected value of the consequences of A1 is higher than the expected value of the 
consequences of A2 (where both expectation values are taken with respect to the agent’s 
credences at the time of decision7). 
                                                          
5 More precisely: A one-dimensional simple symmetric random walk is a series {Sn}n=1,2,…, where (1) for each n, Sn = ∑j=1n Zj, and (2) the Zj are independent random variables, each of which takes the value +1 or -1 with equal probability. It can be shown that in such a series, the expectation value of the magnitude |Sn| is proportional to the square root of n. Thus, in particular, in the limit n→∞, this expectaƟon value E[|Sn|] tends to infinity, rather than to zero. Returning to our case of interest: If (simplifying) we assume that the ‘effects’ of each possible action can be parcelled into discrete components, each of which additively contributes an amount an amount of fixed magnitude but variable sign (thus: either ΔV or –ΔV) to the overall goodness of the world in which it occurs, and that the signs of successive effects are probabilistically independent, then this theorem applies to the case of interest in the way suggested in the main text.  
6 Here I disagree both with Dorsey (2012), who claims that the cancellation postulate (in his terminology, `the balancing-out hypothesis’) a priori `seems plausible’ although `there is no evidence in its favour’, and with Cowen (2006), who regards it as an adequate refutation of the cluelessness worry at least for ‘big’ actions. 
7 Or perhaps: the probabilities that are supported by the evidence that the agent possesses at the time of decision, i.e. the relevant ‘evidential probabilities’. For majority of this paper, the distinction between 
This will not help, however, if consideration of unforeseeable effects8 similarly forces us to accept 
that 
(CWs: Cluelessness Worry regarding subjective c-betterness) We can never have even the 
faintest idea, for any given pair of acts (A1, A2), whether or not A1 is subjectively c-better 
than A2. 
Does consideration of unforeseeable effects force us to accept (CWs)? Analogously to the above, it 
won’t if we can defend the claim that 
(NRs (Non-reversal for subjective c-betterness)) The net effect of taking into account 
unforeseeable effects would not reverse judgments of subjective c-betterness that we reach 
based on the foreseeable effects alone. 
But, in contrast to the objective non-reversal condition (NRo) discussed in section 1, we can defend 
its subjective analog (NRs), at least for the sorts of ‘unforeseeable effects’ we have been considering 
thus far. For consider any possible but unforeseeable future effect9 E1↦E2 that might, via the sorts of 
mechanisms we considered in section 1, result from my decision to perform act A1 rather than A2. 
For sure, it is possible that: if I did A1 then E1 would result and if I did A2 then E2 will result (in 
symbols: A1→E1 & A2→E2). Still, there is no particular reason to think that the correlations 
between my possible actions and these unforeseeable effects will be that way round, rather than 
the opposite (A1→E2 & A2→E1). It seems plausible, in that case, that given any credence function 
that it is rationally permissible for me to have at the time of decision, my credence in the second 
correlation hypothesis is exactly equal to my credence in the first correlation hypothesis. But if this is 
true for all unforeseeable possible effects E1↦E2, then the contribution of those unforeseeable 
effects to the difference in the expected values of A1 and A2 is precisely zero, and we have the 
following result: 
(EVF) The expected value of an action is determined entirely via its foreseeable effects. 
But (EVF) entails (NRs). Thus there can be no analogue of the cluelessness worry for subjective c-
betterness.10 
                                                          subjective credences and evidential probabilities will be of little import. It might become relevant in a more sophisticated discussion of the issues that I touch on in section 6. 
8 Once the focus is subjective rather than objective c-betterness, the appropriate definition of ‘foreseeable’ shifts slightly. For subjective purposes, we should include among ‘foreseeable effects’ not only ‘effects that we can predict with a reasonable degree of confidence’, but also any effects that we have clear overall reason to regard as more likely to follow on some courses of action than on other courses of action. That is, the ‘foreseeable’ effects need not exclude e.g. possible effects that are extremely unlikely either way, but whose probabilities are affected in definite ways by our choice of action. 
9 With slight abuse of terminology, where the context prevents any confusion from resulting, I use ‘effect’ both in the absolute sense (E1 would be among the effects of choosing A1) and in the comparative sense (the transition E1↦E2 would be an effect of choosing A1 over A2). It is, of course, the comparative sense that us ultimately important for the purposes of c-betterness. 
10 Feldman (2006) argues that in fact we are more clueless about subjective c-betterness than about its objective analog. But Feldman’s argument assumes that in order to estimate which of two acts has the higher expected value (and by how much), we need to estimate what the expected value of each act is. This latter task is indeed massively more demanding, but (pace Feldman) is unnecessary. 
3. Lenman’s objection: The Principle of Indifference 
The Principle of Indifference. Lenman (2000) objects to the reasoning in section 2 on the following 
grounds: this reasoning presupposes a Principle of Indifference, but (according to him) that principle 
is false. 
To state the Principle of Indifference, we require a notion of evidential symmetry between mutually 
exclusive propositions. This notion is supposed to capture the idea of our having no more evidence in 
favour of one proposition than the other, or no more reason to believe one proposition than the 
other.11 In particular, we suppose that two propositions are evidentially symmetric when we have no 
evidence that bears on the question of which of the two is true (say, on the assumption that one or 
the other is true). The Principle of Indifference can then be stated as follows: 
(POI: Principle of Indifference) Let Q1,…,Qn be any mutually exclusive propositions that are 
evidentially symmetric for S, and let Q be their disjunction. Let C be any credence function 
that is rationally permissible for S. Then for all i,j, C(Qi|Q)=C(Qj|Q). 
At first sight, this principle looks eminently reasonable. It also seems to tell the right story in at least 
some cases. For example, suppose you know that I am about to flip a coin, and you know nothing 
else relevant to the question of whether it will land Heads or Tails. (In particular, you have no 
information about whether or not the coin is fair, or about the mechanism by which I will flip it.) 
Plausibly, you are rationally required to have credence ½ that my coin will land Heads; any other 
credence seems unacceptably arbitrary. 
Lenman is correct in claiming that the above defence of (NRs) presupposes some form of Principle of 
Indifference. For that reasoning relies crucially on the claim that one’s credence that if the agent did 
A1 then E1 would result and if the agent did A2 then E2 would result is rationally required to be equal 
to one’s credence in the opposite act-effect correlation (i.e. that if the agent did A1 then E2 would 
result and if the agent did A2 then E1 would result). But the only reason given for thinking this is that 
we have no more reason to believe that the former correlation obtains than the latter, or vice versa. 
The required claim follows only if we assume something like (POI) for the present case. Otherwise 
we have no resources with which to criticise an agent who arbitrarily has credence (say) 0.9 that A1 
(resp. A2) would lead to ‘unforeseeable’ effect E1 (resp. E2), while acknowledging that she has no 
reason for favouring this correlation over the other. 
The ‘problem of multiple partitions’. As is well known, however, an unrestricted POI (such as the 
one stated above) is inconsistent, at least unless the relation of evidential symmetry holds between 
far fewer proposition-pairs than we would naively have assumed12. The difficulty is the ‘problem of 
multiple partitions’. It arises from the fact that for any partition {Q1, …, Qn} of Q, there are many 
                                                          
11 I follow White (2010) in employing the terminology ‘evidential symmetry’ to be neutral between these and other formulations. 
12 White (ibid.) argues persuasively that the culprit in these paradoxes may indeed be a too-liberal interpretation of ‘evidential symmetry’, rather than POI itself. This is an important point for the general discussion of POI. Since such ‘shifting of the bump in the carpet’ would not in the end fundamentally change the state of the debate for current purposes, however, here I set it aside for simplicity of exposition, and assume that POI itself is shown to be at fault by the ‘problem of multiple partitions’ that I discuss in the main text. 
other partitions of Q, none of which we are able to single out as privileged; and POI generally gives 
mutually inconsistent results when applied to distinct partitions. 
This problem arises, in particular, when one partition is a ‘selective fine-graining’ of another: that is, 
the second partition involves further fine-grainings of some elements of the original partition but 
not others. Suppose, for instance, you know only that I am about to draw a book from my shelf, and 
that each book on my shelf has a single-coloured cover. Then POI seems to suggest that you are 
rationally required to have credence ½ that it will be red (Q1=red, Q2 = not-red; and you have no 
evidence bearing on whether or not the book is red), but also that you are rationally required to 
have credence 1/n that it will be red, where n is the ‘number of possible colours’ (Qi = ith colour; and 
you have no evidence bearing on what colour the book is).)  
This problem would be of merely theoretical interest if it was intuitively clear, in any given example, 
which partitions were ‘natural’ and which ‘gerrymandered’. For in that case, we could restrict the 
Principle of Indifference to ‘natural’ partitions, and even without a precise criterion for naturalness, 
we would know when to apply vs not to apply POI in practice. And that is arguably an adequate 
response to the book-colour example: at least on reflection, it is clear that neither the partition 
{book is red, book is not red} nor the partition {book is red, book is blue, book is yellow…} is 
especially natural13, so perhaps this is just a case in which POI clearly falls silent. Unfortunately, 
however, there are at least some wide classes of cases in which it is not even intuitively clear which 
partitions should be regarded as privileged for the purposes of POI. (In particular, this often happens 
in scenarios involving credences about some continuous quantity, as continuous quantities are apt to 
have multiple natural parametrisations that are non-linearly related to one another; for discussion, 
see e.g. Gillies (2000, p.38-42).) 
Rejecting POI. In the light of this problem, a widespread consensus (e.g. Hacking 1965, Kyberg 1974, 
Van Fraassen 1989, Sober 2003, Schackel 2007, Norton 2008, North 2010) concludes that, despite 
any initial plausibility that it might naively seem to have had, the Principle of Indifference must 
simply be abandoned: that is, that there is no true constraint on rational credences even remotely 
like POI. (To find genuine rationality constraints on credences, these theorists often hold, we need to 
leave the domain of the a priori altogether: constraints, on this view, might well be found one 
information on frequencies and/or empirically obtained knowledge of mechanisms and state spaces 
is available, but not in any purely a priori manner.) Thus, in rejecting POI, Lenman is far from alone. 
Lenman does not say very much about precisely what form of ‘cluelessness’ would result if his 
argument were accepted, or precisely why and for whom said cluelessness would be problematic. I 
will return to these issues in section 6. First, I will say why I think Lenman’s treatment of these 
‘simple cluelessness’ cases is too pessimistic (section 4), and then present a type of case that 
(however) I do think raises a genuine threat of cluelessness (section 5). 
4. Defence of (NRs) against Lenman’s objection 
                                                          
13 In particular: although it may initially be tempting to say that the partition into ‘all possible colours’ {red, blue, green, …} is natural and an appropriate candidate for applying POI, this is clearly implausible on reflection: there is nothing especially natural or unnatural, for instance, either about a partition that identifies turquoise as a colour distinct from blue and green, or about one that declines to do so. 
Against this consensus, however: what the ‘problem of multiple partitions’ shows is only that a fully 
unrestricted Principle of Indifference is false (at least given a too-inclusive notion of evidential 
symmetry). It does not show that there are no true restrictions of POI. And simply rejecting all 
indifference-based reasoning wholesale, as Lenman apparently proposes to do, does seem to throw 
out too much baby with the bathwater: both in everyday reasoning, and in science. Quite 
independently of the issue of cluelessness, it seems clear that there are at least some cases in which 
something very like POI gives the right account. 
We gave one everyday example above (in which you know only that I am about to flip a coin, and 
that the two sides of the coin are labelled Heads and Tails). For scientific examples: medical trials, for 
instance, ultimately aim to guide (posterior) credences about which medications have which effects, 
or about which patients have which conditions.14 But, as a matter of statistical reasoning, one can 
arrive at such restrictions on rational posterior credences in response to evidence only given claims 
about what prior credences ought to have been. The standard procedure here is to assume that the 
rational agent begins, prior to gathering evidence, with a `flat’ or `uninformative’ prior – but that is 
just another term for a prior that satisfies some suitable form of indifference principle. An epistemic 
agent who was genuinely willing to make any such assumption would be left with no grounds for 
following his doctor’s advice regarding the post-test probability that he has any given medical 
condition, or regarding which treatments are likely to help. What this shows is that, the quantity of 
ink that has been spilt against indifference reasoning notwithstanding, none of us is in fact this type 
of epistemic agent. 
The (warranted) more optimistic view of the situation vis-à-vis cluelessness is as follows. For sure, 
the Problem of Multiple Partitions shows, as we conceded above, that the conjunction of an overly 
general Principle of Indifference with an insufficiently critical application of the notion of evidential 
symmetry leads to paradox. Suppose we concede for the sake of argument that the culprit is the 
fully general Principle of Indifference (i.e., rather than the notion of evidential symmetry). Then this 
fully general Principle of Indifference is false. But since just about any principle, true or otherwise, is 
a special case of some natural generalisation that is false, this establishes little. It shows only that 
the true principles in this vicinity have to be restrictions of the Principle of Indifference, rather than 
that original principle itself. 
We must further concede that we do not (yet?) know how to formulate the appropriate restrictions, 
at least for many or most of the cases of interest. This is an unfortunate situation, in theoretical 
terms: we are in a situation of impoverished understanding, and we would prefer to understand 
more. But situations of impoverished understanding should not in themselves surprise us: no-one 
thinks that the business of epistemology has been completed, whether or not it is completable. 
There are, then, some ‘good cases’: cases in which some form of indifference reasoning generates 
rational constraints on credences, and we are in a position to recognise these cases as such, 
notwithstanding the fact that we do not (yet?) know precisely what form of indifference reasoning it 
is that does the generating. It is equally clear – intuitively – that the case in hand is just such a ‘good 
                                                          
14 Here I concur with the ‘Bayesians’ over the ‘classicists’ regarding the cognitive aim of experimentation. For an accessible survey of this controversy in the foundations of statistics, see Sober (2008, chapter 1). On the general point that a wholesale rejection of indifference reasoning goes too far, I am in agreement with White (2010). 
case’. While there are countless possible causal stories about how helping an old lady across the 
road might lead to (for instance) the existence of an additional murderous dictator in the 22nd 
century, any such story will have a precise counterpart, precisely as plausible as the original, 
according to which refraining from helping the old lady turns out to have the consequence in 
question; and it is intuitively clear that one ought to have equal credences in such precise-
counterpart possible stories. And the failure (and paradoxical nature) of a completely general 
Principle of Indifference provides no grounds for doubting this intuitive verdict. 
5. Complex cluelessness 
There are, however, cases that threaten cluelessness in a structurally very different way, and that 
fall outside the scope of any even remotely plausible form of POI. I will refer to the existence of 
these cases, and the problem that they arguably pose for anyone who seeks to guide their actions 
even partially by considerations of goodness of consequences, as the ‘Complex Problem of 
Cluelessness’. The remainder of the paper is much more tentative than sections 1-4; its purpose is 
more to raise than to resolve a problem. 
The cases in question have the following structure: For some pair of actions of interest A1, A2,  
(CC1) We have some reasons to think that the unforeseeable consequences of A1 would 
systematically tend to be substantially better than those of A2; 
(CC2) We have some reasons to think that the unforeseeable consequences of A2 would 
systematically tend to be substantially better than those of A1; 
(CC3) It is unclear how to weigh up these reasons against one another. 
This talk of ‘having some reasons’ and ‘systematic tendencies’ is not as precise as one would like; but 
some examples should convey the idea. The most vivid15 examples of this phenomenon occur in the 
context of ‘Effective Altruism’ (as outlined by e.g. MacAskill (2015), Singer (2015)). In this context, 
the agent is considering devoting a significant portion of her resources, in terms of time and/or 
money, with the express purpose of causing as much good as possible for a fixed amount of input 
resource. Since the actions in question here involve at least moderate and optional sacrifice on the 
part of the agent, and since in addition the whole point of the actions under consideration would be 
to maximise good, any cluelessness about which actions have that property feels particularly galling 
– hence (perhaps) the special vividness. 
Here is just one such example. Effective altruists place a lot of weight on the recommendations of 
independent charity evaluators, whose aim is to rank charities, as far as possible, in terms of overall 
cost-effectiveness: ‘amount of good done per dollar donated’. One charity that consistently comes 
out top in these rankings, at the time of writing, is the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF), a charity 
that distributes free insecticide-treated bednets in malarial reasons. To justify this verdict, the 
charity evaluators clearly need (inter alia) estimates of the consequences of distributing bednets, per 
extra net distributed (and hence per dollar donated). Equally clearly, however, these charity 
evaluators, just like everyone else, cannot possibly include estimates of all the consequences of 
distributing bednets, from now until the end of time. In practice, their calculations are restricted to 
                                                          
15 ‘EA’ is not, of course, the only source of examples with this structure. In fact, cases with the structure given in (CC1)-(CC3) are ubiquitous. I return to this point, and its significance, in section 7. 
what are intuitively the ‘direct’ (‘foreseeable’?) consequences of bednet-distribution: estimates of 
the number and severity of cases of malaria that are averted by bednet-distribution, for which there 
is reasonably robust empirical data. In fact, the standard calculation16 focusses exclusively at the 
effectiveness of bednet-distribution in averting deaths from malaria of children under the age of 5, 
and (using standard techniques for evaluating death-aversions) concludes that those benefits alone 
suffice for ranking AMF’s cost-effectiveness above that of most other charities. It is only if our 
condition (NRs) holds when these effects alone are treated as the ‘foreseeable’ ones that the charity 
evaluators’ calculations can have the intended significance. 
Averting the death of a child, however, has knock-on effects that have not been included in this 
calculation. What the calculation counts is the estimated value to the child of getting to live for an 
additional (say) 60 years. But the intervention in question also has systematic effects on others, 
which latter (1) have not been counted, (2) in aggregate may well be far larger than the effect of 
prolonging the child’s life on the child himself, and (3) are of unknown net valence. The most 
obvious such effects proceed via considerations of population size.17 In the first instance, averting a 
child death directly increases the size of the population, for the following (say) 60 years, by one. 
Secondly, averting child deaths has longer-run effects on population size: both because the children 
in question will (statistically) themselves go on to have children, and because a reduction in the child 
mortality rate has systematic, although difficult to estimate, effects on the near-future fertility 
rate.18 Assuming for the sake of argument that the net effect of averting child deaths is to increase 
population size, the arguments concerning whether this is a positive, neutral or a negative thing are 
complex. But, callous as it may sound, the hypothesis that (overpopulation is a sufficiently real and 
serious problem that) the knock-on effects of averting child deaths are negative and larger in 
magnitude than the direct (positive) effects cannot be entirely discounted. Nor (on the other hand) 
can we be confident that this hypothesis is true. And, in contrast to the ‘simple problem of 
cluelessness’, this is not for the bare reason that it is possible both that the hypothesis in question is 
true, and that it is false; rather, it is because there are complex and reasonable arguments on both 
sides, and it is radically unclear how these arguments should in the end be weighed against one 
another. 
To get a Principle of Indifference to be of any help here, we would have to regard conditions (CC1)-
(CC3) above – conditions under which there are competing reasons of quite different characters, and 
no obviously canonical way of weighing those reasons against one another – as conditions of 
“evidential symmetry” for the purposes of POI. To be sure, at the level of description in the previous 
sentence, the evidential situation is ‘symmetric’ between the two propositions in question. However, 
in this case – unlike the ‘simple problem cases’ – this appearance of symmetry disappears as soon as 
we probe to a deeper level. There is an obvious and natural symmetry between the thoughts that (i) 
                                                          
16 http://www.givewell.org/international/top-charities/amf#Whatdoyougetforyourdollar 
17 A different sort of concern that (however) would equally be grist to the ‘new cluelessness’ mill has been pressed by Emily Clough (2015): that some effective-altruist-funded interventions might have large and negative longer-run consequences via their political effects. In particular, Clough worries that direct funding of front-line health services by outsiders might diminish the tendency of governments of low-income countries to provide high-quality healthcare services themselves (and of the citizens of the countries in question to demand such things from their governments). 
18 For attempts to determine the latter, see, for example, Roodman (2014) and references therein, and Shelton (2014). 
it’s possible that moving my hand to the left might disturb air molecules in a way that sets off a chain 
reaction leading to an additional hurricane in Bangladesh, which in turn renders many people 
homeless, which in turn sparks a political uprising, which in turn leads to widespread and beneficial 
democratic reforms… and (ii) it’s possible that refraining from moving my hand to the left has all 
those effects. But there is no such natural symmetry between, for instance, the arguments for the 
claim that the world is overpopulated and those for the claim that it’s underpopulated, or between 
the arguments for and against the claim that the direct health benefits of effective altruists’ 
interventions in the end outweigh any disadvantages that accrue via diminished political activity on 
the part of citizens in recipient countries. And, in contrast to the above relatively optimistic verdict 
on the Principle of Indifference, clearly there is no remotely plausible epistemic principle mandating 
equal credences in p and not-p whenever arguments for vs. against p are inconclusive. 
Relatedly: unlike the ‘simple problem of cluelessness’, which strikes many people as sophistical from 
the start (at least once a notion of subjective betterness is admitted), this ‘complex problem of 
cluelessness’ feels real and important – at least to many of us, in some circumstances. Many who 
would otherwise be drawn to Effective Altruism nonetheless refrain from donating any significant 
portion of their earnings, not because of any positive belief that refraining from donating will have 
better consequences19, but from a sense that they would require more confidence that their 
donations really would be doing some significant amount of good – less cluelessness – before they 
are willing to take the bold-feeling step of donating a significant proportion of their income. And, 
among those who do donate, many donate significantly less than they would if they had no such 
cluelessness-based worries; they commit partially to the EA ethos and in consequence ‘hedge their 
bets’, donating some significant amount (in case doing this really does do a lot of good), but far less 
than they might (in case their sacrifices are all just wasted, or, worse, actually harmful in the long 
run). Furthermore, even those ‘hard effective altruists’ who have somehow overcome these worries 
for practical purposes will, I think, admit that they still feel the pull of these concerns. There is a 
deep sense of ‘decision discomfort’ attending the predicament of being forced to make decisions in 
situations of the character we are now discussing. 
6. The nature of cluelessness 
Three questions about cluelessness. I have argued that although the cases normally focussed on in 
the cluelessness literature (‘simple problem’ cases) generate no genuine threat of cluelessness, 
nonetheless there does exist a different class of cases (the ‘new problem’ cases) that do generate 
such a genuine threat. In light of this, the following three questions become salient. 
First: What is the right theoretical description of cluelessness? That is, what exactly is our 
predicament, in terms of both epistemic and practical normativity, when we face a situation of this 
type? 20 
                                                          
19 Some people do refrain from donating for this other reason – some people think, for example, that thye should not child mortality reduction because “there are too many people anyway”. Those people are (or take themselves to be) in a simpler epistemic situation, and are not my focus here. 
20 Those unconvinced by the arguments of section 4 can take this discussion to apply equally to the ‘simple problem’; there has been surprisingly little said about the precise nature of cluelessness in the ‘simple problem’ literature. 
Given an answer to this first question, we could use it to tackle the second and third questions. 
Second: to what extent is it actually true, in cluelessness cases, that consideration of consequences 
cannot guide moral/practical decision-making or evaluation? And third: What is the source of the 
phenomenology of deep `decision discomfort’ that seems to attend (genuine) cluelessness cases, for 
agents who are at least approximately rational? 
A sceptic might respond to these questions as follows. (1) Just as orthodox subjective Bayesianism 
holds, here as elsewhere, rationality requires that an agent have well-defined credences. Thus, 
insofar as we are rational, each of us will simply settle, by whatever means, on her own credence 
function for the relevant possibilities. And once we have done that, subjective c-betterness is simply 
a matter of expected value with respect to whatever those credences happen to be. In this model, 
the subjective c-betterness facts may well vary from one agent to another (even in the absence of 
any differences in the evidence held by the agents in question), but there is nothing else distinctive 
of ‘cluelessness’ cases; in particular, (2) there is no obstacle to consequences guiding actions, and (3) 
there is no rational basis for decision discomfort. 
Imprecise credences. This sceptical response may in the end be the correct one. But since it at least 
appears that something deeper is going on in cases like the one discussed in section 5, it is worth 
exploring alternatives to the sceptical response. The alternative line I will explore here begins from 
the suggestion that in the situations we are considering, instead of having some single and 
completely precise (real-valued) credence function, agents are rationally required to have imprecise 
credences: that is, to be in a credal state that is represented by a many-membered set of probability 
functions (call this set the agent’s ‘representor’).21 Intuitively, the idea here is that when the 
evidence fails conclusively to recommend any particular credence function above certain others, 
agents are rationally required to remain neutral between the credence functions in question: to 
include all such equally-recommended credence functions in their representor. 
Above (in section 2), we defined subjective c-betterness in terms of expected values. But subjective 
expected values are, as they stand, defined only for agents who have precise credences. There is 
thus an open question about how the notion of ‘subjective c-betterness’ should be extended to the 
case of imprecise credences. Relatedly: we have not yet said anything about how subjective c-
betterness relates to normative questions of what one ought to do. But we have noted that on any 
plausible normative theory, there will be some important connection. There will, in that case, 
similarly be an open question about how to extend the normative theory to the case of imprecise 
credences. 
Three criteria of permissibility under imprecise credences. We will have forged a connection to 
(some sort of) normativity if we state a principle linking imprecise credences to (some sort of) 
permissibility. Consider, then, the following three rival principles of permissibility for the imprecise-
                                                          
21 Since it deals in credence functions, this approach is broadly Bayesian. The more orthodox Bayesian alternative holds that agents are always rationally required to have some particular precise credence function, but that, especially in situations like the ones we are considering here, it is either the case that many credence functions are rationally permissible (that is, the ‘uniqueness thesis’ fails), or (if uniqueness does hold) that agents are not in any position to know which credence function is rationally required. Several of the issues I discuss below for the imprecise-credence case also have natural counterparts in the precise-credence framework; in the main text, I focus exclusively on the imprecise-credence case only for reasons of brevity. 
credence case22; each is a generalisation of the ‘maximise expected value’ principle in the precise-
credence context. 
(LP) Liberal criterion of permissibility: Act A is permissible in circumstances C iff no other act 
that is available in C has higher expected value with respect to all elements of the 
representor. 
 (RP) Restrictive criterion of permissibility: Act A is permissible in circumstances C iff no 
other act that is available in C has higher expected value with respect to any element of the 
representor. 
 (SP) Supervaluational criterion of permissibility: It is determinately true that A is 
permissible in C iff there is no other action available in C that has higher expected value with 
respect to all elements of the representor. It is determinately false that A is permitted in C iff 
with respect to each element of the representor, some other act available in C has higher 
expected value. Otherwise it is indeterminate whether or not A is permitted in C. 
In the imprecise-credence model, situations of cluelessness seem to be ones of ‘intra-representor 
disagreement’, in the following sense: 
(ID: Intra-representor disagreement) In a situation of cluelessness, the elements of one’s 
representor disagree with one another on the question of which act(s) maximise(s) expected 
value.  
I will return shortly to the question of what each of the criteria (LP), (RP), (SP) implies (given (ID)) for 
our questions (2) and (3). First, a short digression.  
Degree of neutrality among normative theories. Up to this point in the discussion, I have been at 
pains to theorise in a way that is neutral among rival candidate accounts of the connection between 
considerations of consequences and normative principles: I have discussed only (various notions of) 
betterness, assuming only that there is some important connection between betterness and 
normativity (in particular: I have not assumed consequentialism). But our key questions, in the 
present section, concern the implications of cluelessness for decision-guidance and decision 
discomfort. Clearly, nothing can be said about these implications without taking on some 
commitments about the nature of that connection. From here, it therefore becomes less 
straightforward to maintain complete neutrality. 
At first sight, a discussion focussed on the above criteria (LP), (RP), (SP) might in fact seem to be of 
interest only in the context of maximising consequentialism. Clearly, versions of these criteria are 
potentially of interest in that context. For one way in which such a criterion could arise begins from a 
corresponding criterion for subjective c-betterness in the case of imprecise credences, and adds to 
that a (maximising-consequentialist) principle according to which an act is morally permitted iff no 
other available act is subjectively c-better. 
                                                          
22 These criteria (or close cousins thereof), and others, are discussed in more detail in e.g. Elga (2010), Williams (2014), Rinard (2015), Weatherson (MS). 
Do non-consequentialists, therefore, have to get off the boat at this point in my discussion, and each 
conduct an entirely separate discussion of the normative issues, in the context of their own 
particular non-consequentialist account of the precise connection between betterness and 
normativity? In fact, while complete neutrality among normative theories may be impossible in this 
part of the discussion, we can be substantially more optimistic than that regarding the prospects for 
continuing theory-neutrality. With suitable flexibility over the interpretation of the notions of ‘value’ 
and ‘permissibility’ in the criteria (LP), (RP), (SP), it is not clear that anything in those principles need 
immediately alienate any of quite a wide variety of non-consequentialists. 
To see this, first suppose, for example, that one favours the theory developed by Scheffler (1982), 
combining impartial-consequentialist considerations with agent-centred prerogatives. In that theory, 
there is considerable flexibility (within the bounds of morality) for the agent to decide the relative 
weightings of impartial considerations, on the one hand, vs. considerations that are specially 
important only from the agent’s own ‘personal point of view’ on the other. But still, once the agent 
has settled this question, (1) he will be equipped with a value function, and (2) rational permissibility 
(given the values that the morally acceptable agent has thereby settled on) presumably requires, in 
the precise-credence case, maximising the expectation value of that value function. 
More generally, it is widely recognised that, if one is willing to countenance agent-relativity of the 
value function, then just about any normative theory can be represented via a value function (in 
arguably misleading terminology, any normative theory can then be ‘consequentialised’): one 
merely needs to construct some function that accurately represents the verdicts of the theory in 
question on questions of overall (moral or rational) comparative choiceworthiness. (See, e.g., 
Portmore (2009) and references therein.) And once that is done, at least one very natural account of 
permissibility under uncertainty involves a criterion of maximising expected choiceworthiness; the 
criteria (LP), (RP) and (SP) can then be regarded as extensions of the criterion of ‘choiceworthiness’ 
in this (not necessarily consequentialist) sense to the case of imprecise credences. 
This is of course not to say that the structure of every normative theory will necessarily be such as to 
make principles anything like (LP), (RP), (SP) either (1) applicable even in principle, or (2) the most 
natural or illuminating accounts of normativity under imprecise credences. It is also not entirely 
clear, given only that consideration of consequences in the ordinary sense leads to ‘intra-representor 
disagreement’ in cases like those discussed in section 5, that this will remain true even when the 
value function is interpreted as capturing this potentially far broader class of normative 
considerations. The identification of normative theories for which the discussion as I carry it out here 
is thus unsuited, and the development of analogous lines of thought for those theories, 
unfortunately lie beyond the scope of this paper. For the remainder of the paper, I will simply 
assume that the correct theory of normativity is amenable to the general ideas of maximising 
subjectively expected choiceworthiness and that (ID) supplies the correct characterisation of 
cluelessness situations within an imprecise-credence approach, and investigate the prospects for 
developing an adequate account of cluelessness on that assumption. 
Cluelessness via (LP).  Assuming (LP), a situation of cluelessness is one in which each of the actions 
among which one is clueless is permitted. In this sense, theory (based on consideration of 
‘consequences’) indeed issues no guidance in the agent’s choice among these options; yet, for 
practical purposes, the agent still has to choose. He must, therefore, choose arbitrarily. Might 
cluelessness, therefore, amount simply to the predicament of being forced by circumstance to make 
an arbitrary choice? 
Something in the ballpark of ‘arbitrariness’ certainly seems key to the phenomenon of cluelessness. 
But, it is important to recognise, forced arbitrary choice cannot on its own suffice for cluelessness. 
To see this, consider Buridan’s Ass. The ass’s predicament is that (there are no relevant imprecise 
credences but) two actions tie for first place, either in terms of known actual value or in terms of 
subjective expectation value. That is, the ass knows that the two options in question are (in objective 
or subjective terms) equally good. In this type of predicament, too, one is forced to choose 
arbitrarily. But here, unlike a situation of genuine cluelessness, there is no call for decision 
discomfort or paralysis. To be sure, Buridan’s Ass itself (the story has it) failed to recognise this, 
succumbed to decision paralysis, and died of starvation as a result. But most of us, I take it, have 
progressed beyond this irrationality. We are perfectly happy in such cases of known equal goodness 
simply to choose arbitrarily; we feel no deep decision discomfort in those cases. What this shows is 
that the phenomenon of cluelessness, insofar as it is real, cannot be merely a matter of forced 
arbitrariness. There must be something deeper going on. 
(LP), however, seems unable to capture any deeper sense of cluelessness. For it is a theory according 
to which the actions in question all have the same normative status as one another (viz., that of 
being permitted). It thus seems committed to the view that vis-à-vis considerations of cluelessness, 
decision situations like those we considered in section 5 really are relevantly just like that of 
Buridan’s Ass. Insofar as the phenomenon of cluelessness in fact does involve some rational deeper 
sense of decision discomfort, this counts against (LP). 
Cluelessness via (RP). Assuming (RP), a situation of cluelessness is one in which no act is permitted: 
if the probability functions in the agent’s representor mutually disagree about the permissibility of 
each available option, then, given (RP), all available options are impermissible. On this account, 
therefore, situations of cluelessness are thus ones of (rational or moral) dilemma. 
It is worth noting, however, that the resulting ‘dilemmas’ would be significantly different in 
character from those of a more familiar character. Dilemmas have been most extensively discussed 
in the moral case, where they are normally thought to arise (if at all) in cases in which the agent 
faces a set of jointly exhaustive options, each option being in some significant way abhorrent. (This 
class includes ‘lesser evil’ cases; a typical example is Williams’ case of Jim and the Indians (Williams 
(1973), pp.98-9).) Given a deontological theory23 that issues absolute prohibitions, for example, it 
could easily happen that every available option violates at least one of the theory’s prohibitions, and 
is therefore wrong according to the deontological theory. On this approach and given this kind of 
dilemma, it is easy to understand how moral dilemmas could give rise, if not to cluelessness, then at 
least to deep discomfort: the agent is forced to make a choice, but (if morally conscientious) has a 
strong moral aversion to some particular feature of every available option. In the present case, in 
                                                          
23Moral dilemmas are normally thought not to occur on a consequentialist approach; indeed, depending on 
their intuitions as to the plausibility of moral dilemmas in general, many theorists take this to be either a 
significant advantage or a significant disadvantage of consequentialism. It is therefore worth noting that given 
imprecise credences and the criterion (RP) for moral permissibility, this link between moral dilemmas and 
subjective consequentialism would fail. 
contrast, there need not be anything abhorrent about any of the options: it need not be, for 
instance, that any of the options involves killing, or letting disaster occur, or cruelty, or any such 
thing. It is only if the agent has a strong aversion to moral wrongness per se that there will 
necessarily be any such sense of abhorrence attending moral dilemmas of the kind under 
consideration. 
And in any case – more pertinently for the purposes of our present discussion – there is no reason to 
think that moral dilemmas of either type should lead specifically to a sense of cluelessness, rather 
than to some other form of discomfort. Even those deontologists who think that lesser-evil cases 
constitute moral dilemmas generally acknowledge that in some sense the appropriate thing to do is 
to choose the lesser evil, rather than to be paralysed by the observation that all available acts are 
wrong. And in the absence of any notable imbalance among the options in terms of goodness, 
amount of ‘evil’ and so forth, a perfectly acceptable way to respond to a situation in which all 
options are impermissible and that is all that can be said is simply to pick arbitrarily. For this too 
would be a case in which theory positively tells us that there is nothing to choose, morally, among 
the options in question. (RP), therefore, like (LP), also seems to furnish only a very shallow sense of 
cluelessness, little deeper (if at all) than that facing Buridan’s Ass. Again, insofar as the phenomenon 
of cluelessness seems deeper, this counts against (RP). 
Cluelessness via (SP). Assuming (SP), for any given option in a situation of cluelessness, it is 
indeterminate whether or not that option is permitted. This verdict seems to offer more promise for 
capturing the intuitive sense of cluelessness: the agent seeks to choose his actions in response to the 
permissibility facts, but his actions must be determinate, while those permissibility facts remain 
stubbornly indeterminate. Nor is it obvious that we can say here, as we did in the cases of (LP) and 
(RP): “But theory tells us that all actions have the same moral status (viz., here, that of indeterminate 
permissibility), so we are free just to choose among them arbitrarily”. For the relevant candidates for 
normative status arguably do not include ‘indeterminate permissibility’: rather, they include only the 
first-order evaluations permitted, required, forbidden. And in these first-order terms, the criterion 
(SP) does not tell us that the available actions all have the same normative status: depending on the 
details of the case, it either (1) tells us either that it’s indeterminate whether they do or not, or (2) 
tells us that (it’s determinately true that) the available options do not have the same moral status, 
but that it’s indeterminate which particular options are required/permitted/forbidden. While these 
remarks amount to only a very preliminary exploration of the possibilities, therefore, the imprecise-
credence model together with (SP) is the most promising route I am aware of for capturing the 
phenomenology of deep decision discomfort.24 
7. Mundane cluelessness 
Effective Altruism makes the new problem of cluelessness particularly vivid, and is therefore a good 
context (for us) to focus on in considering ‘new cluelessness’. Clearly, though, insofar as what is 
distinctive of those cases is (as I have suggested) the satisfaction of conditions (CC1)-(CC3) in section 
                                                          
24 The phenomenon I am calling ‘decision discomfort’ is discussed at greater length by Williams (2016) (who calls it ‘angst’). Williams argues that mere knowledge that one’s action is indeterminately permissible does not suffice for the phenomenon in question, but goes on to offer an alternative account of the features of the situations in question that he thinks do account for it. I am not convinced of the details of Williams’ proposal, but I lack the space to explore this further here. 
5, the basic phenomenon is far from specific to that context: cases with the structure in question 
also occur in myriad other decision contexts, at both large and small scales. For example: (1) A 
government’s decision-making predicament for any large-scale policy decision – for instance, 
concerning whether or not to go to war, or whether or not to raise taxes to finance additional 
spending on education or healthcare. (2) An individual’s decision as to which degree course to sign 
up for, which job to accept, whether or not to have children, how much to spend on clothes, 
whether or not to give up caffeine.25 In these cases, no less than the effective-altruist examples 
discussed above, (a) there are good consequence-based reasons/arguments for favouring each of 
two alternative actions and also (b) there is no obviously canonical way of weighing up those reasons 
or arguments against one another. 
It follows that insofar as the source of cluelessness is the satisfaction of conditions (CC1)-(CC3), one 
should feel clueless in these everyday cases no less than in the effective-altruist cases. 
To what extent do we feel clueless in everyday cases? Some people, for sure, suffer from decision 
paralysis every time the arguments for and against rival possible actions are inconclusive. But here, 
the appropriate line to take seems more dismissive of a ‘clueless’ reaction than was arguably the 
case in section 5. This sort of ubiquitous decision paralysis seems more to be a pathology, bordering 
on a mental illness, rather than the norm. Most of us simply learn to live with the need to resolve 
decisions with some arbitrariness and with incomplete guidance from data and theory, and, while 
we may feel more secure in non-arbitrary cases, neither are we especially bothered by the need for 
arbitrariness, or “sensible judgment”, when that need does arise. This suggests that either an 
excessive deference to the sense of arbitrariness in the effective-altruist cases is also a pathology, or 
conditions (CC1)-(CC3) do not after all strike to the root of the phenomenology of cluelessness in 
effective-altruist cases. In the latter case, the correct account of cluelessness might lie altogether 
elsewhere than in the imprecise-credence accounts explored in section 6. 
8. Conclusions 
Let A1, A2 be available actions, and let V(A1), V(A2) the overall goodness of the worlds that would 
ensue if I performed acts A1, A2 respectively. ‘Simple cluelessness’ was supposed to arise merely 
from the likelihood that the largest contribution to the objective value-difference V(A1)-V(A2) is due 
to unforeseeable effects of these actions, while (however) that contribution is of unknown sign. I 
have argued (contra Lenman) that while that is indeed very likely, it poses no problem for a 
‘subjective’ criterion of c-betterness, framed in terms of the expectation values of V(A1) and V(A2). 
That was because while the unforeseeable effects almost certainly dominate the objective value-
difference V(A1)-V(A2), they make zero contribution to the expected value-difference E[V(A1)-V(A2)]. 
To be sure, the case for that last claim relies on some restriction of the Principle of Indifference. But, 
I have argued, despite the fact that a fully general Principle of Indifference is paradoxical, it is 
                                                          
25 Of course, in private decision-making in particular, the ‘theory of the good’ that the decision-maker seeks to employ for the evaluation of consequences is unlikely to be an impartial one. But just as considerations of cluelessness might (I argued above) look structurally just the same for a wide class of rival moral theories (including non-consequentialist ones), so considerations of cluelessness look structurally just the same in the domain of rationality as they do in the theory of morality. If, for instance, the private individual cares only about his own family, then the relevant value function for that context is one concerning well-being of his family alone, but the remainder of the discussion is largely unaffected. 
overwhelmingly plausible that some suitable restricted Principle of Indifference is true. The simple 
problem of cluelessness is no problem, for consequentialists or for anyone else. 
Matters look somewhat different, however, in a different type of case. In ‘simple problem’ cases, the 
unforeseeable effects under consideration were ones that, while they could result from (say) some 
particular act A1, they could equally easily, and in precisely analogous ways, result from any of the 
relevant alternative acts. It is this precise analogy between the possibility that (say) choosing A1 over 
A2 would lead to effect E1 rather than E2, and the ‘opposite’ possibility that choosing A1 over A2 
would lead to E2 rather than E1, that renders plausible the indifference reasoning that is so intuitive 
in those cases. In contrast, in ‘complex problem’ cases (I stipulated), one has more specific reasons 
for suspecting particular, systematic correlations between acts and ‘indirect’ effects, but too many 
such reasons: non-isomorphic reasons that point in different directions, and for which there is no 
canonical weighing-up operation. In those cases, no form of indifference principle is at all plausible, 
and the threat of cluelessness is more genuine. 
It is not at all obvious on reflection, however, what the phenomenon of cluelessness really amounts 
to. In particular, it (at least at first sight) seems difficult to capture within an orthodox Bayesian 
model, according to which any given rational agent simply settles on some particular precise 
credence function, and the subjective betterness facts follow. Here, I have explored various 
possibilities within an ‘imprecise-credence’ model. Of these, the most promising account – on the 
assumption that the phenomenon of cluelessness really is a genuine and deep one – involved a 
‘supervaluational’ account of the connection between imprecise credences and permissibility. 
It is also not at all obvious, however, how deep or important the phenomenon of cluelessness really 
is. In the context of effective altruism, it strikes many as compelling and as deeply problematic. 
However, mundane, everyday cases that have a similar structure in all respects I have considered are 
also ubiquitous, and few regard any resulting sense of cluelessness as deeply problematic in the 
latter cases. It may therefore be that the diagnosis of would-be effective altruists’ sense of 
cluelessness, in terms of psychology and/or the theory of rationality, lies quite elsewhere. 
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